

SOME SOCIAL - PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN A TURKISH VILLAGE ¹

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I. The Problem :

A neglected but controversial area in development studies is concerned with the social-psychological aspects of social change. The crucial problems in this area are centered around (a) how structural changes are mediated to individuals and groups, and (b) whether these, in turn, produce consistent changes in outlook, attitudes and behavior which have been frequently depicted as an "individual modernity" syndrome (Smith and Inkeles 1966, Kahl 1968, Doob 1967, Dawson 1967).

The neglect of these problems is partly due to the fact that social-psychological theories proper, have not dealt with the interactional problems mentioned above, but have postulated psychological prime-movers such as achievement motivation or innovativeness as crucial factors in the making of entrepreneurs or innovators. These individuals, who differ from their peers in terms of their early childhood socialization and overall psychological makeup, are assumed to provide the major impetus to social change (Mc Clelland 1961, Hagen 1961, 1962). Here, the process of change is itself explained in terms of psychological independent variables.

On the other hand, efforts have been made at defining empirical syndromes of inter-related attitudes treated as dependent variables, or micro-level counterparts of crucial social determinants such as "urbanization, education, mass communication, industrialization and politicization" which are themselves assumed to form the inter-related compo-

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nents of a comprehensive process of "modernization" (Inkeles 1966, p. 139). In this case, the problem has been one of defining and measuring those attributes and attitudes best suited to differentiate between Traditional and Modern settings, the assumption being that men "have everywhere the same structural mechanism underlying their socio-psychic functioning despite the enormous variability of the culture content which they embody" (Inkeles op. cit. p. 377).

The first approach, which consists essentially of psychological reductionism, confronts us with an overly static picture of so-called "traditional" society, an undue stress on early childhood socialization as opposed to later learning and a neglect of the institutional and structural features which mediate between individuals and societies (Erasmus 1962, Kasdan 1965).

The second approach, leaving aside the macro-sociological problems involved in the Traditional-Modern dichotomy, presents us with a clichéd, over-integrated picture of value systems and fails to account for any consistencies or inconsistencies there may be between social position and values and of values among themselves in the process of change³ (Feldman and Hurn 1966).

The critical issue from a social-psychological point of view seems to be an analysis of the process whereby the structural and individual levels enter into reciprocal interaction. This analysis involves a discussion of how and to what extent the pace and pattern of structural change is reflected at the attitudinal and behavioral levels, of what attitudinal dimensions are most directly relevant to different aspects of structural change, and finally a critical appraisal of the implications of the foregoing for the hypothesized entity of "individual modernity."

In view of these considerations, my major aim in dealing with a village community as a case study has been to focus on the social changes it has undergone in as much as they have affected its social structure, and on the latter in as much as it has affected the social-psychological

³ Typically, Modern man is presented as rational, open to new experiences, empathetic, independent of parental authority, non-fatalistic, non-superstitious, cosmopolitan, achievement oriented and optimistic about controlling his environment, to name but a few characteristics. Traditional man is assumed to exhibit the opposite of the above mentioned attributes. "Modernization" tends, consequently to be viewed as a matter of transition of individuals from Traditional to Modern.

make-up of the community. After a brief account of social change, the social structural and social-psychological variables used in this study will be spelt out and their inter-relationships discussed.

II. The Setting: Social Change in Sakarya.

Sakarya is situated 90 kms. S. W. of Ankara and administratively attached to Polath. It was found by settled migrants arriving from the Balkans, mainly Tartars of Crimean origin, under a settlement scheme for nomads and migrants during the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamit. Accounts of the early period show household economy to be greatly dependent on available male labour and vulnerable to inheritance patterns, very much along the lines suggested by existing literature on the subsistence grain-farming plateau village (Stirling 1965, Berkes 1942, Cuisenier 1967, Helling 1966).

It is difficult to assess the extent of production for the market during the period between settlement and the introduction of farm mechanization (1905-1950). It seems to have been very variable with frequent retreat into subsistence and years of severe hardship bordering on famine in 1926-27 and 1944. Village isolation seems an established fact since the dirt road leading to Polath, 18 kms. away, offered only seasonal and difficult passage by horse-drawn carriage or by foot. All accounts suggest that the village was a relatively self-contained unit in terms of sheer physical isolation, with a relatively undifferentiated social stratification and erratic production for the market.

Farm mechanization started in Sakarya in 1950, after a large number of tractors were let into Turkey under E.C.A. auspices and purchased by villagers under extremely favourable credit schemes during the rule of the Democratic Party. Farm mechanization brought about the immediate and far reaching consequences of speeding up production, creating land shortage and changing land tenure, with consequent unemployment and underemployment which have been widely documented at a national level (Robinson 1952, 1958, E. and A. Hirsch 1963, Aktan 1957, Faculty of Political Science Survey 1953, Karpas 1960). One of the most noteworthy developments in Sakarya, when the village lands reached their cultivable limits was a "rush for land" where mechanized villagers went out of the village and as far South as the plain of Konya in search of land tenancy. This tenancy was a new form of contractual relation whereby mechanized farmers rented land by paying a

specified amount per dönüm (*icar*), thus optimizing their holding size to make mechanization feasible. Clearly, while labour constituted the major limiting factor in the pre-mechanized period, land took on the most critical role after mechanization, so that ultimately the differing fortunes of many households could be explained in terms of their ability to retain and optimize their holdings in the face of pressures to pay debts incurred through credit for tractors and production costs. As land value rose and mechanization spread in the area, the terms of land tenancy got increasingly unfavourable. Most villagers were unable to meet the ever increasing cost of tractor maintenance, neither could they make up for it by increasing production through tenancy, or pay their now chronic "bank debts."

Meanwhile, non-mechanized small producers found it increasingly profitable to let out their land on an *icar* basis to mechanized farmers. Thus, the former could secure a fixed income from land which they had to supplement with additional sources such as wage-work, while mechanized farmers used these smaller holdings to optimize their larger ones. This created a new dependence of small producers on mechanized farmers who benefited from this symbiotic relationship. Despite these unsettling trends the period between 1950-56 was a time of great prosperity for the village coinciding with good harvests, increasing the mobility and purchasing power of villagers greatly.

After 1956, the high rate of inflation, the rise of production and land costs, and agricultural underemployment called for further adaptations. Some households where the father had sufficient capital resources to finance some new business for himself or his sons "diversified" into new activities such as commerce or transportation, thus turning agricultural underemployment to their advantage. The profits of these diverse activities ultimately stimulated agricultural production by providing the necessary capital to rent or even purchase land and meet production costs. Some members of such households even migrated to town to take up new commercial activities. Another successful adaptation, achieved by two households in partnership, was to abandon farming altogether and take up commercial dairying. This led to the creation of new types of households which despite their residentially nuclear composition (i.e. sheltering father, mother and unmarried children only) are linked to paternal and fraternal households by complex economic links, some-

times cutting across the boundaries of village and town and functioning somewhat like a family firm.

For small landowners a whole spectrum ran from those who used side occupations, mainly skilled and unskilled wage-work, to supplement their income from land, to those who used land income as a mere addition to the bulk of their earnings from other occupations. In addition, according to the 1965 Sakarya Village Inventory 29 % of households were totally landless and had to rely entirely on the wages of their members. The activities of the Land Distribution Commission in 1967, which left only 4 totally landless households in the village, did not change the objective situation of villagers to any great extent since they were still dependent on outside mechanical help, still had to rely heavily on subsidiary income sources and remained indebted.⁴

The problems and tensions generated by this context culminated in organizational change with a grass-roots initiative on the part of a group of villagers to found a village Co-operative. The aims of this Co-operative, which appeared as a response to the growing vulnerability of small producers, were two-fold. On the one hand, it was to make them less vulnerable to internal pressures to let out their land and engage in unfavourable deals in terms of land rent by providing a Co-operative tractor which could be used by members at running cost. On the other, it was to protect them from external pressures to sell at low harvest prices in order to settle debts with merchants. In addition, it was hoped that the Co-operative might raise enough credit to set up some profitable village enterprise, like a dairy farm or a brick yard, and provide some new outlets and sources of employment in the face of the tightening land situation.

The 1968 headman elections were fought over the Co-operative issue. Elections were won by the Co-operative supporters very narrowly. There was understandable opposition on the part of those villagers who relied on land tenancy from non-mechanized small producers and who provided other expensive services (such as the transportation of winter coal) now rendered by the Co-operative. More interesting, however,

⁴ The official distribution norm estimated by the Commission for the quality of Sakarya soil was 275 dönüms for a five-person household. However, due to land shortage only a partial norm of 175 dönüms could be enforced so that in fact most of the beneficiaries remained marginal or sub-marginal.

was the opposition of villagers who although in an objective position to benefit from the Co-operative, could not extricate themselves from multiple obligations to the first group.

The Co-operative did not bear its promise. Both internal opposition and the difficulty of raising sufficient credit forced it to restrict its activities to a minimum. The tractor was unable to meet the needs of all Co-operative members and the Co-operative itself unable to engage in marketing activities and even less to develop a profitable village enterprise. It is interesting to note that while mechanization was readily adopted, the Co-operative which aimed at a reorganization of production, could not be absorbed into the village and met resistance from a pre-existing structure of economic relationships.

The same economic and social changes that led to the foundation of the Co-operative have also been instrumental in creating organic links between the village and town centers. These links are maintained through frequent visits to the Polath market, to merchants, to banks, to repair and spare parts shops and to entertainment centers. In addition, 35 % of villagers report leaving the village for work as temporary migrants and 37 % of those go to large urban centers such as Ankara, Istanbul and Eskişehir. A further significant link with towns is through migrant relatives extending the kin network outside the village boundaries. Out-migration has been steadily increasing over the last twenty years and there have been departures from 60 % of the households. Increased urban exposure is, thus, very concretely part of the life of villagers both through their own contacts and through their urban-dwelling kin.

In summary, the passage of Sakarya from traditional grain farming to mechanized, market-oriented production has produced changes in the social stratification of the village, involving new types of dependence and contractual relations, changes in household structure, the foundation of a Co-operative and a great increase in mobility and urban exposure. This complex network of influences reflects itself both on the present social structure and the social-psychological make-up of the community.

III. Method:

This study was carried out from August 1969 to July 1970. An initial six month period of participant observation, the study of official

documents and depth interviews were used as groundwork for a more structured approach. A survey was then carried out by questionnaires administered in interview form, to the total adult male population of the village defined as all males over 16, and covering 65 households and 79 respondents.

The questionnaire covers a wide range of topics from factual information about socio-economic background and household composition, to the assessment of attitudes and behaviors commonly related to "modernity" (such as educational standards, mass media exposure, intra-familial relations, religiosity, etc.).

Single-item variables were used in the case of socio-economic background indicators and personal attributes (such as household membership, position in the village social stratification, age and education). This left a large pool of single-item questions covering a wide range of behavioral and attitudinal areas which had to be combined into a smaller number of variables for final analysis.⁵ This was achieved by an indexing procedure; items which were both conceptually and empirically related were combined into unweighted indices by being assigned individual scores which were summed up into an overall index score. Each index was tested for internal consistency and item to total score correlations were computed as an additional check.

To provide uniformity for final analysis, the score distributions for each index were trichotomized into High, Medium and Low on the basis of frequencies, trying as far as possible to approximate a tri-modal distribution. These indices, involving a posteriori gradations in terms of frequencies in the general population made the equal-interval assumption illegitimate. Thus, a non-parametric measure of association, γ , was used and tested for significance (Goodman and Kruskal 1954, 1959). Ten indices were compounded and judged adequate in terms of internal consistency. These are: Co-operative Participation,

⁵ The single-item question form was favored and the use of *a priori* scales avoided, to overcome difficulties of comprehension involved in a non familiar exercise and more importantly because of the need for an "objective" frame of reference about the actual incidence of any attitude or behavior within the village, above and beyond the villagers' own evaluations of frequency or intensity. This has meant that any gradations, classifications or ranking in any behavioral or attitudinal area had to be introduced *a posteriori* on the basis of this frame of reference.

Mass Media Exposure, Educational Aspiration, Family Permissiveness, Liberalism to Women, Optimism, Security, Religious Strictness, Superstitious Beliefs and Superstitious Practices.⁶ The content, conceptual relevance and interrelationships of these measures will be spelt out throughout our discussion.

IV. Social Structural Variables :

The selection of adequate socio-economic background indicators, capable of reflecting both the social structure of the village and the changes it has undergone, was one of the most delicate tasks of this study. Those retained for final analysis were:

a) Household type (membership in different types of household, from extended to nuclear), b) Rank (position of respondents in terms of village social stratification), c) Co-operative participation (membership, felt need and earliness of involvement in the Co-operative).

a) Household type

The different types of village households were assessed by the double criteria of *residential composition* and the nature of *economic links* between married men and their father or brothers. Three types of households emerged :

i) *Nuclear households* which shelter father, mother and unmarried children (54 %). These function as independent production and consumption units and are referred to by villagers as "separate income, separate consumption" households (kazancı da, kazanı da ayrı).

ii) Households which are residentially nuclear but differ from the former in that they sustain permanent economic links with paternal and/or fraternal households deriving common benefits from undivided property in land, farm implements or business enterprise. These are referred to as "common income, separate consumption" households (kazancı bir, kazanı ayrı). They have emerged as a direct response to the changes described above and constitute 25 % of all village households. From now on, we shall refer to these more simply as "*common income*" households.

iii) *Extended households* functioning as common production and consumption units and sheltering father, mother, married sons and

⁶ The complete list of items in these indices may be obtained from the author, Social Sciences Department, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

their family. They form the smallest percentage of village households (21 %). These are referred to as "common income, common consumption" households (*kazancı da, kazanı da bir*). There is an increasing tendency towards early separation. Thus, living in an extended household is often a short phase in the life cycle of a married couple. Nevertheless, such households generally reflect a capacity to feed their members from their land and to rely less on other types of income, a finding which has been frequently substantiated in rural communities at large (Wolf 1966, p. 70).

TABLE I
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RANK, SIZE OF LANDHOLDING,
TOTAL YEARLY INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE

		1	2	3	4
Rank	(1)		.69	.79	.60
Size of Landholding	(2)		****	****	****
Total yearly income	(3)			.71	.41
Household Type	(4)			****	***
					.58

Levels of significance

*** $p < .005$

**** $p < .001$

When households are grouped into the three-fold classification of nuclear, common income and extended, high positive correlations appear between household type and economic indicators such as size of landholding, total yearly income and rank, indicating that extended and common income household membership entails greater wealth and a higher position in the social stratification of the village (See Table 1). As such, household type seems to be a useful indicator of socio-economic status. In addition, the supposed persistent association of the patriarchal extended household with "traditionality" both at a social and psychological level (Goode 1963, Hagen *op. cit.*, Whiting 1961, Lewis 1955) makes the household a particularly relevant social unit in analyzing the social-psychological implications of change.

b) *Rank*

Land is undoubtedly the most important source of wealth in the village. However, land ownership in Sakarya is accompanied by such crucial additional factors that it cannot adequately be used by itself as a socio-economic background indicator. Apart from the size and quality of land holdings factors such as the ownership of farm implements (singly, in partnership among close kin or in non-kin partnerships), the terms of cultivation of one's land (with one's own tractor, with hired mechanical help, by hiring land out etc.), the ability to enlarge one's holding through land tenancy, the degree of indebtedness or solvency of households are but a few which have to be taken into account. Generally, the ownership of complete farm implements, the ability to cultivate one's own land and the ability to rent extra land are associated to larger holding sizes, making landownership a good indicator at the higher extremes of the spectrum. However, in the low-middle range which covers the majority of Sakarya villagers (69 % have holdings between 50-200 dönüms), the different types of arrangements resorted to for the cultivation of land, the degree of indebtedness for credit and through spurious borrowing introduce such important fluctuations as to make land holding size a poor indicator of socio-economic status.

Estimates of total yearly income have also been obtained by assessing gross returns from land, animal produce, wage-work and commercial occupations. However, both the intricacies of joint ownership, especially relevant in the case of "common income" households, and the fact that income does not satisfactorily reflect positions in the social stratification led us to adopt a different measure. (Consider, for instance, that a village teacher, a small landowning household and a landless household of skilled wage-workers could be very similar in terms of income although their places in the village productive system vary greatly.)

Five selected village "judges" were instructed to rank households according to their over-all economic status, taking into account all possible economic contingencies. The names of all household heads were written on cards and sorted into consecutive piles by the judges ranking from upper to lower. The rankings of the judges were then compared and each household was assigned the rank on which most judges agreed; each respondent was then assigned the rank of the household to which he belongs. Agreement among judges was very high and the use of six

ranking categories (from upper to lower) was arrived at by the judges themselves. However, considering the small number of households in the "upper" category of each rank (7 in each case), the ranks were reduced to three (Upper, Middle and Lower) without much loss of information. Rank emerged as a satisfactory measure of socio-economic status. It has high correlations with size of land holding, total yearly income and household type.

TABLE 2

	Number of households	Size of Land Holding	Income	Occupation/ side occupation	Partnerships	Household type
Upper	16	Average size between 401-600 dn.	Average between 30-50.000 TL. per annum	Farming and commercial (Dairying and wheat trade)	Family enterprise	Predominantly extended and "common income"
Middle	24	Average size between 101-200 dn.	10-20.000 TL. per annum	Farming and skilled wage-work; truck driving, minibus driving etc.	Partnerships among non-kin, generally no partnerships	Predominantly nuclear, some extended and "common income"
Lower	25	Average size between 0-100 dn.	5-10.000 TL. per annum	Farming and mainly unskilled wage-work	No partnerships	Predominantly nuclear

In addition, the strata delimited by Rank involve households which stand in very similar position in terms of production. The upper stratum contains households with large to medium land holdings, whose non-agricultural income, if any, is commercial (such as wheat trade, motor transportation and dairying). The lower stratum is also homogenous and incorporates households with little land, mainly obtained from the

Land Distribution Commission, unable to cultivate their land from their own resources and relying heavily on skilled or unskilled wage-work. The middle stratum, which is somewhat less homogeneous, involves small and medium landowners who, while generally deriving their main income from land, vary a great deal in their side occupations and have additional income from wage-work, small commercial enterprise or both. Cases of partnership among non-kin households to farm implements and transport vehicles can be found in this stratum, as well as attempts to get supplementary income from custom ploughing and motor transportation on the side. Table 2 summarizes the major characteristics of Sakarya social stratification as delimited by Ranks.

c) *Co-operative participation*

Alongside changes in the social stratification and household organization of the village, the foundation of the village Co-operative has introduced a totally novel element into the village social structure and created sub-groups which differ from one another mainly in their chosen affiliation. The Co-operative participation index is thus our only group membership measure which cuts across social stratification. At the moment 54 % of the villagers are members of the Co-operative. However, considering that an increasing number of villagers eventually joined the Co-operative, some of whom were even initially opposed to the project, it was important to distinguish between founding members, early joiners, late joiners and non-members for a more accurate assessment of participation. For the same reason, different degrees of felt need for a village Co-operative had to be taken into account. Membership, earliness of involvement and strength of expressed need were compounded into the *Co-operative participation* index.

V. *Social-Psychological Variables :*

Together with household membership, rank and Co-operative participation, villagers' broader orientations must depend at least partly on their *own* perception of their position and on their feelings of optimism and security about the village. One set of social-psychological variables therefore cover villagers' subjective evaluations of their social position. Another set of relevant social-psychological dimensions are those commonly related to "individual modernity."

a) *Subjective evaluations of social position*

The most straightforward approach consisted in asking villagers how they felt about their own household compared to others, namely whether they felt they were better off than most, worse off than most or in an intermediary position. There was a relatively close match between such self-evaluations and more objective measures such as Rank ($\gamma = .60$), size of landholding ($\gamma = .67$) and Household Type ($\gamma = .51$).

This match between actual and perceived status was of limited value in informing us about individual variations in cognitive outlook and orientations, since it did not tell us how individuals actually felt about their position and status.

One set of orientations which have been combined into the *Optimism index* involved perceptions of upward or downward mobility in the recent past, expectation of mobility for the future and perceptions of wealth polarization in the village. On the whole, feelings of improvement about the recent past were found to relate to expectations of future improvement and perceptions of decreasing polarization, while feelings of deterioration were related to expectations of further deterioration and greater perceived polarization.

An equally significant aspect of personal orientation was assumed to depend on the degree of security or insecurity individuals experience with regards to their future in the community. The security-insecurity dimension was evaluated by the following: a general tendency to perceive the village as a place where people feel more or less secure about their future, degrees of willingness to work in a factory and willingness, in a problem situation, to select outcomes weakening one's ties with the village. The assumption made and borne out was that the more insecure people would tend to perceive the village as a place where most people worry about their future, they would tend to welcome factory work both for themselves and their children, and would when presented with a hypothetical choice situation, tend to opt for less village-centered outcomes (for instance, agree to sell land and leave the village). These tendencies were combined into the *Security index*.⁷

⁷ A more detailed account of the Content and internal consistency of these indices can be obtained from the author.

b) *Variables related to "individual modernity"*

The aspects of modernity dealt with cover four important institutional realms, namely education, mass communications, family and religion. These also constitute concrete behavioral dimensions along which it is possible to detect both general trends in the village and important inter-individual variations. The variables and indices covering these areas are : Age, Education, Educational Aspiration, Mass Media Exposure, Family Permissiveness, Liberalism to Women, Religious Strictness, Superstitious Beliefs and Superstitious Practices.

i) *Age*

There is an articulated code of social expectancies related to different age-levels in Sakarya. These are mainly in the direction of greater demands for social conformity in the transition from unmarried to married status, and pressures towards greater passivity and display of religious piety in the transition to elderly status. However, these distinctions in terms of age and marital status are losing some of their practical importance and what makes age a relevant attribute with respect to modernity now, are the new experiences which younger people, especially the post-mechanization generation, have been exposed to.

ii) *Education and Educational Aspiration*

The village primary school was founded in 1938, had only one teacher and provided three years of schooling. There is, at present, a new school building, five classes and two teachers. Until 1956, no one in the village had any secondary education. Then, a group of village children were sent to Polath for secondary education and this set a new trend which is on the increase.

It has been suggested that there is a point of "modernization take-off" in attitudinal and aspirational variables, especially in educational aspirations, when an individual has more than five years of schooling (Rogers and Svenning 1969). In Sakarya, although most villagers (79 %) have had only five or less years of formal education, educational aspiration seems to have grown much faster than the objective conditions that actually make further education possible.

The *Educational aspiration* index covers desired levels of education for boys and girls. These are much higher than anything villagers have

been, or are likely to be able to give their children. As many as 87 % would like their sons to go to University and 29 % would like the same for their daughters. This seems hardly realistic in terms of rural occupations. However, there is evidence that many villagers do not think in rural terms and as many as 56 % do not expect their children to stay in the village. This may be viewed both as a desire for mobility into non-agricultural profession and a reaction to the insecurities of farming life.

iii) *Mass Media Exposure*

Increased access to mass media has been as repeatedly related to modernization as education (Schramm 1964, Lerner 1958, Rao 1966, Rogers and Svenning op.cit., de Sola Pool 1966). The three major media to which villagers are exposed are newspapers, radio and the cinema. Frequencies of exposure to the three media were combined in the *Mass Media exposure index*.

iv) *Familial variables*

Relative independence from parental authority and freedom from obligations to close kin have also been frequently associated with modernity. In Sakarya, the tendency towards early separation from paternal households, despite the maintenance of close relationships of mutual support among kin, has provided a new autonomy in the management of every day affairs and in expenditure patterns which led to corresponding changes in the patterns of authority within the family. The *Family Permissiveness* index covers various aspects of permissiveness or restrictiveness in a household, namely the degree to which self-reliance rather than respect or obedience is encouraged for children, the degree of freedom or interference from parents in the choice of a marriage partner and the degree of consultation in decision making within the family.

Another significant aspect of familial relations is an area of well-known conservatism, namely the place and status of women. Despite a growing tendency to give girls more education and a more tolerant attitude in the choice of a marriage partner, there is a sharp reversal of this relative permissiveness to near-total segregation and submission when a woman is married. Advancing age and childbearing are still the major determinants of female status. However, there is a slight but

growing tendency for increased participation of wives in the social activities of their husbands. The *Liberalism to Women* index, is a very partial measure of attitudes to women and elicits expressed male willingness for shared activities such as taking their wife to visits, to excursions, to the cinema, on shopping trips and to restaurants. Although the occasions for such participation are in actual practice rather restricted, the index uncovers degrees of attitudinal acceptance of more egalitarian conjugal roles.

v) *Religiosity and Superstitions*

The secularization of religious beliefs and the substitution for supernatural beliefs and folk medicine of belief in natural causes and faith in modern medicine are considered to be central components of a modernity syndrome.

To assess the secularization of religious beliefs, a *Religious Strictness* index was used covering activities which could be considered as Islamic religious sins, namely hanging pictures, consuming alcohol, lending money with interest, using birth control, taking bank rates (which is another form of interest), and reading the Koran in Turkish.

The *Superstitious Beliefs* index includes belief in the evil eye, in paralytic strokes, in djinns and fairies, in the devil and in magic.

The *Superstitious Practices* index covers wearing charms, resorting to exorcism or healing prayers, giving alms, making offerings, lead-pouring and fortune telling.

VI. *Inter-relationships Between Social-Structural and Social-Psychological*

Variables:

It has already been pointed out that our major concern was to discuss the ways in which structural changes are reflected at the attitudinal and behavioral levels and to see whether and to what extent these produce a coherent "individual modernity" syndrome. The specific problems to be dealt with here are, thus firstly the degree of consistency or coherence among variables related to "individual modernity" and secondly the relationship of these variables both to social-structural variables and to subjective evaluations of social position.

i) *Inter-relationship among "individual modernity" Variables*

It has often been suggested that the different components of "individual modernity" as they have been previously outlined, tend to fall

into a consistent pattern or syndrome despite the variety of institutional realms they cover.

An inspection of Table 3 reveals both consistencies and inconsistencies among these variables.

TABLE 3

MATRIX OF INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES RELATED TO MODERNITY

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Age	(1)									
			-.69 ****	-.06	-.85 ****	-.07	.20	.02	.08	.08
Education	(2)									
Educational aspiration	(3)			.26 ****	.91 ****	.28 +	.13	-.26 +	-.53 ****	-.41 ***
Mass Media exposure	(4)				.30 *	.23 +	.05	-.31 *	-.32 *	-.21
Family permissiveness	(5)					.34 **	.15	-.55 ****	-.50 ****	-.38 ***
Liberalism to women	(6)						.46 ****	-.47 ****	-.09	-.19
Religious Strictness	(7)							-.12	-.09	-.09
Superstitious beliefs	(8)								.51 ****	.30 *
Superstitious practices	(9)									.67 ****

Levels of significance

- + p < .05
- * p < .025
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .005
- **** p < .001

The indices covering different aspects of the same or related areas had high positive correlations among themselves as in the case of Family Permissiveness and Liberalism to Women (.46), Religious Strictness, Superstitious Beliefs and Superstitious Practices (.51, .30, .67), Education and Mass Media exposure (.91). There were also correlations which cut across these different areas; Education, Mass Media Exposure, Educational Aspiration and Family Permissiveness were positively correlated to one another and negatively correlated to Religious Strictness, Superstitious Beliefs and Superstitious Practices, pointing to a relatively con-

sistent configuration going in an expected direction. However, a closer examination reveals several discrepancies.

Firstly, Age was differentially related to some indices and not to others. It had high negative correlations with Education and Mass Media Exposure, confirming the greater access of younger people to education and to the media, but was unrelated to either religiosity and superstitiousness, or to familial variables. Likewise, Liberalism to Women despite its significant correlation with Family Permissiveness did not reach significance with any of the other indices. While Education had high negative correlations with Superstitious Beliefs and Superstitious Practice its correlation to Religious Strictness was much weaker, suggesting that the primary impact of education may be on the lessening of superstitions rather than the secularization of religious beliefs. In contrast, Family Permissiveness was significantly and negatively related to Religious Strictness but not to superstition indices.

Also, since the highest correlations were between the indices covering the same or closely related areas, we may in fact be dealing with distinct dimensions, involving separate antecedents and consequences, and not with some consistent psychic syndrome. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw any serious inferences about a psychic unity underlying these variables without reference to the structural antecedents, in terms of which some of the observed discrepancies could possibly be explained.

ii) *Inter-relationships between Social Structural and "individual modernity" Variables*

A clear relationship was found between Rank, Household Type, Education and Mass Media Exposure, suggesting that higher rank and membership in extended or "common income" households, which are closely related are also associated with greater education and mass media exposure (Table 4). Although this result could easily be attributed to the greater capacity of certain strata and households to provide their members with education, Age appears as an additional factor which may account for the strength of these relationships. This is due to the fact that younger age-groups seem to be over-represented in higher strata and especially in extended and "common income" households, and that it is the *younger* members of the community who have benefited from greater educational opportunities for historical reasons, mainly of availability.

The greater presence of younger villagers in extended households may be explained in terms of the cyclical development of the joint family. The younger and more newly married an individual is, the more likely he is to still be living in his father's household. In "common income" households a different process, directly related to social change, operates to produce similar results in age distribution. Where the fragmentation of the extended household is due to intra-familial division of labour, out-migration, which as we have already noted, is a widespread consequence of such specialization, (See p. 5) usually takes away the older members of such households leaving the younger in charge of the

TABLE 4
MATRIX OF INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN RANK, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AGE,
EDUCATION AND MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE

		1	2	3	4	5
Rank	(1)					
Household Type	(2)		.40 ***	-.20	.35 *	.40 ***
Age	(3)			-.36 *	.43 ***	.30 *
Education	(4)				-.69 ****	-.85 ****
Mass Media exposure	(5)					.91 ****

Levels of significance

- + p < .05
- * p < .025
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .005
- **** p < .001

land and of their nuclear households. It is the joint effect of these mechanisms, namely the cyclical development of extended households on the one hand and the differential out-migration from "common income" households on the other, which contributes to the relationship of higher

social position to younger age and of younger age to higher education and mass media exposure. As such, these relationships appear not so much as expected, a priori associations, but as intricate links grounded in the social and historical antecedents of the village.

These links of Rank and Household Type to education and mass media exposure did not appear with our other indices. Rank had weak negative and zero-order correlations with familial, religiosity and superstition indices. With Household Type, although in terms of education and mass media exposure extended households were, if anything, the more modern, greater family permissiveness and liberalism to women were associated with nuclear households, while religiosity and superstitiousness were unrelated to household membership. Even with familial variables, the negative relationship between extended household membership and Family Permissiveness was non-significant ($\gamma = -.19$), whereas with Liberalism to Women it reached significance ($\gamma = -.34$).

This finding can be explained in terms of the differential impact of social change on different areas of family life. The changes in agricultural technology, reducing the need for labour, leading to greater mobility, greater scope for specialization and the introduction of new sources of income constitute potent centrifugal forces for youngsters (whether they decide to leave the village or not) and have a direct bearing on authority relations in the family. These changes have not in any way affected the position and status of women, which continues to be an area of conservatism in the village. It is in this last respect that extended households *do* rate significantly lower than the others by providing a well-defined hierarchy within an all-female network and better segregated spheres of activity within the household which delay the development of conjugal roles and discourage participation in common activities.

Of all the social-structural indicators used, the best predictor of "individual modernity" across a wide range of indices was *Co-operative participation*. Higher Co-operative participation entailed younger age ($-.33$), higher education (.41), greater mass media exposure (.55), greater family permissiveness (.49), lower religious strictness ($-.53$) and lower superstitiousness in beliefs ($-.36$), thus correlating significantly with all but two indices. It is only with Co-operative participation that the different components of modernity fell into a relatively consistent pattern, involving a variety of areas. Thus, if we must pos-

tulate an outlook related to change, we can safely assume that in the case of Sakarya, it is best predicted by organizational affiliation, and that of the changes which have taken place since mechanization it is organizational change which seems to have mobilized the modernity resources of the community.

iii) *Inter-relationships between Subjective Evaluations of Social Position and "individual modernity" Variables*

Villagers' self-evaluation of their position as compared to other households had a high correlation with Rank, and exhibited relationships similar to those of Rank with modernity indices. Higher self-evaluation entailed younger age ($-.35$), higher education ($.33$), and higher mass media exposure ($.36$) but was unrelated to familial, religiosity or superstition indices.

Optimism may be considered as an indicator of cognitive orientation because it involves evaluative judgements of improvement or deterioration which are determined to a great extent by the respondents' comparison level or reference point. It is difficult to predict a priori what the effect of optimistic vs. pessimistic orientations could be with regards to the varied aspects of individual modernity. One possible assumption is that individuals who are more pessimistic, and hence under greater psychological pressure may also feel impelled to change more in other behavioral and attitudinal respects. An equally plausible assumption is that such individuals could "retreat" into a more conservative, traditionalistic outlook.

The first assumption was partially borne out by the correlations of the Optimism index which were of negative sign with educational aspiration ($-.17$), mass media exposure ($-.23$), family permissiveness ($-.37$) and liberalism to women ($-.39$) and positive with religious strictness ($.24$) and superstitious practices ($.17$). However, despite the fact that these correlations went in an expected direction they were mainly non-significant. The only significant correlations were those between Optimism and the *familial* indices. The same applied to the *Security index* which correlated positively with Optimism (*Table 5*).

It was already suggested that growing permissiveness in the family may be a function of the changing economic conditions of village life, in particular with respect to the increased outward-lookingness produced by the new exigencies and insecurities of farming life. The negative

correlations between Optimism, Security and the familial indices indicate that those villagers who feel *more* optimistic and *more* secure about their position in the village also tend to be *less* permissive in familial matters, including attitudes to women.

It is interesting to note that Optimism and Security have higher and more significant correlations with familial indices than actual membership in one or another type of household. They are broader orientations, which are related to the ways in which individuals have experienced social change, and which seem to mediate between position in structural terms and the attitudinal level.

TABLE 5
MATRIX OF INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN OPTIMISM,
SECURITY, FAMILY PERMISSIVENESS AND LIBERALISM TO WOMEN

		1	2	3	4
Optimism	(1)				
			.24	-.37	-.39
Security	(2)		+	**	***
				-.51	-.34
Family Permissiveness	(3)			****	**
					.46
Liberalism to Women	(4)				****

Levels of significance

- + p < .05
- * p < .025
- ** p < .01
- *** p < .005
- **** p < .001

The fact that these seem to have a *specific* and marked bearing upon familial attitudes does not seem surprising. It is inasmuch as villagers see little hope or future in the village for themselves and particularly their offspring that they will tend to exercise less control over

them and let them make their own decision. This also seems to carry over into more liberal dealings with women. In summary, when social structural variables and subjective evaluations of social position were taken account a differentiation appeared among the variables related to individual modernity. Thus, while modernity in the areas of education and mass media exposure was associated with higher economic standing, higher self-evaluation of position and younger age for reasons of availability, changes in familial attitudes were found to rest largely on structural changes in the economy and household composition, mediated to individuals through feelings of pessimism and insecurity about the village. It was Co-operative participation which, as a structural measure, had wider implications for a more integrated individual modernity, and implied in addition a significantly more secular and non-superstitious outlook.

VII. Discussion :

It is possible to conclude that there have been different types of modernizing (or change-inducing) influences in Sakarya which have produced distinct and only partially interconnected results. On the one hand, we have those influences which have their source in *increased mobility* and *urban exposure*, like education and mass media exposure and which have been more available to the younger and wealthier sections of the community. On the other hand, there are influences stemming more directly from *structural changes* in the village. These are among others, new sources of livelihood, changes in household structure and the foundation of the Co-operative. These influences are neither separate nor mutually exclusive. However, they seem to operate in different ways, and because there are different sorts of causative factors at work at a structural level, inconsistencies may be expected in what has often been considered a consistent modernity syndrome. Thus, being a more educated, more media attending young man from a wealthier household may not have any implications, or may have contradictory implications as far as religious or familial attitudes are concerned.

Modernity at social-psychological level emerged from this study as having highly complex relationships with the structural level in a manner which almost militates against postulating such a syndrome if it is to be abstracted from the concrete historical circumstances which

lend it meaning and unity. Ultimately, the assumed psychic unity behind measures of individual modernity may be a complex reflection of cross-cutting structural influences. However, the problem remains of operating at a level of generalization more adequate to deal both with changes at a macro-level and with the complexities of individual change. In this respect, our measures of strict socio-economic background were of limited use in predicting attitudes, while broader orientations such as Co-operative participation, Security and Optimism involving more complex determinants of group affiliation or cognitive orientation had a more direct bearing on attitudes. The most fruitful direction for further research in this area seems to lie in the discovery of the multiple mediating concepts which could provide the link between positions in social structural terms, perception of such positions and broader attitudinal spheres.

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ÖZET

BİR TÜRK KÖYÜNDE TOPLUMSAL DEĞİŞMENİN BAZI SOSYO-PSİKOLOJİK BOYUTLARI

Toplumsal değişimin bireysel tutum ve davranışlar üzerindeki etkisi gelişme alanında az işlenmiş bir konu olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Bu makalede, toplumsal değişimin bazı çalışmalarda iddia edildiği gibi bütünleşmiş bir "bireysel modernleşme sendromu" meydana getirip getirmediği, Polath'ya bağlı Sakarya köyü örnek vak'a olarak kullanılarak, tartışılmaktadır. Sakarya köyünde ziraî makineleşmeden bu yana meydana gelen değişimleri yansıtan sosyal yapı değişkenleri ile sosyo-psikolojik seviyede modernleşmeyi ölçen göstergeler arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkiler incelenmektedir. Sosyo-ekonomik değişken olarak bireyin mensup olduğu sosyal tabaka, aile tipi ve kooperatif üyeliği ele alınmıştır. Sosyal-psikolojik gösterge olarak ise yaş, eğitim seviyesi, eğitsel emeller, iyimserlik, sosyal güvenlik duygusu, kitle haberleşme araçlarından yararlanma, aile içi münasebetlerde hoşgörü, kadınlara karşı tutumlar, dindarlık ve batıl inançlar işlenmiştir. Bu göstergeler arasındaki ilişkilerde modernleşme sendromu hipotezini desteklemeyen bazı tutarsızlıklar bulunmuştur. Öyle ki, sosyal tabaka, eğitim seviyesi, yaş ve kitle haberleşmesinden yararlanma birbirleriyle yakın kişili olmakla beraber, aile içi münasebetler ve dindarlıkla ilişkisiz veya ters ilişkili olarak görülmektedir. Aile içi münasebetlerde hoşgörü derecesi ve kadınlara karşı tutumlar belirli yapısal değişmelerin yarattığı sosyal güvensizlik ve kötümserlikle ilgili olmakla beraber diğer göstergelerden müstakil bir boyut olarak belirlemektedir. Sadece kooperatif üyeliği bütün sosyo-psikolojik modernleşme göstergeleriyle tutarlı korelasyonlar vermektedir. Netice olarak, bu bulgular toplumsal değişimin bu belirli ortamda gösterdiği özelliklerle izah edilmekte, sosyo-psikolojik genellemelere girerken bu etkileşimi daha etkin bir şekilde ifade edecek kavramların araştırılması önerilmektedir.